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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY OF COUNTY TREASURER
FOR FUNDS DEPOSITED IN INSOLVENT BANK-LIABILITY FOR
SCHOOL DISTRICT FUNDS-People on relation of the Board of
County Commissioners of the County of Jefferson vs. Koenig, et
al.-No. 13823-Decided November 30, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Hilliard.
An action by the people, on relation of the board of county com-
missioners of the county of Jefferson, to recover from the county treas-
urer and the surety on his bond, the sum of a balance to the credit of
the county with Kountze Brothers, a failed New York banking copart-
nership, for which the treasurer and his surety disclaiming liability
refused to account. The defendants had judgment below.
1. The county treasurer kept an account with Kountze Brothers
from which the depositary paid school district bond obligations made
payable there, whenever presented. The item was carried on the treas-
urer's books as a county deposit and was not carried in the names of the
several school districts. The school districts had made their bond cou-
pons payable at the banking house of Kountze Brothers. The mere fact
that the school districts made their interest coupons payable at the bank-
ing house of Kountze Brothers did not obligate the treasurer of the
county to keep funds on deposit with that institution to meet such obli-
gations as they matured and were presented for payment.
2. The county treasurer was not concerned about the place, man-
ner or fact of payment of school district obligations.
3. The county treasurer may not relieve the school districts by
making a general deposit of county funds with some depositary to
which the school district creditors may resort for payment and escape
the consequences should the depositary fail.
4. The county treasurer was not legally justified in making the
deposit of funds in the New York bank which later failed, nor in the
interests of the school districts was he bound to do so.
5. In making the deposit in the New York bank the county
treasurer acted gratuitously and is liable for the loss attending his unau-
thorized deposit.
6. The mere fact that the school districts made their coupons
payable only at the banking house in New York and the further fact
that the treasurer forwarded money to it for the purpose of taking care
of such coupons did not justify the treasurer in escaping liability for
the loss of the funds due to the failure of the bank.
7. A county treasurer is held strictly accountable for the public
money collected by him, the failure of banks in which he has deposited
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funds and with whatever faith, constitutes no defense for the loss of
the funds.
8. The treasurer here must be held to bear the burden resulting
from the failure of a banking institution which he trusted.-Judgment
reversed.
Mr. Justice Butler concurs in part and dissents in part-Mr. Jus-
tice Bouck and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY-ACCESSORY-LIMITATION OF Evi-
DENCE-The People vs. Spinuzza-No. 13858-Decided No-
vember 9, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The People brought this case on assignment of error as to the law
after the defendant had been convicted of receiving stolen property. The
court below by its instruction limited the evidence to be considered by
the jury to property which had been previously stolen by some other
person and not to consider evidence of the value of the property received
by the defendant in which the defendant participated in the stealing.
By reason of this instruction the jury found the defendant guilty of
receiving three sacks of sugar, only, and he was sentenced to 60 days in
the county jail. The evidence disclosed that Spinuzza bought the three
sacks of sugar from three parties who burglarized a store and was
informed where the sugar was hidden. He told the burglars that he
could use some more sugar and anything else that they could get ahold
of. The burglars went back to the store and stole nine more sacks of
sugar and a quantity of cigarettes, tobacco and other merchandise which
they hid and they then called the defendant and he came to the place
where the merchandise was hidden and received it. The defendant then
told them he could use some coffee and the burglars a third time went
to the store and stole coffee while Spinuzza was standing in the back of
the store.
1. On this set of facts the defendant could have properly been
charged as a principal on the second and third entries of the store, but
not on the first. The evidence was sufficient to show that he was guilty
of receiving stolen property, being the fruits of the first and second
entries of the store.
2. The defendant not being present at the commission of the
crime that he encouraged and having received stolen property from the
commission of such crime, was subject to prosecution for receiving
stolen goods which in this case not only included the three sacks of sugar
taken in the first entry, but also included the nine additional sacks of
sugar and other property taken on the second entry and the trial court
was in error in limiting the amount of the value of the prQperty stolen
to the three sacks of sugar.--Judgment disapproved.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating.
DICTA
WATERS-FLOODS-LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS FOR
CONSTRUCTING DIKE OBSTRUCTING WATER COURSE-Vene-
tucci vs. City of Colorado Springs-No. 1363 8-Decided Novem-
ber 30, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Venetucci sued the City of Colorado Springs for damages on the
ground that a dike constructed by the city diverted surface or flood water
onto his property and injured the land and the improvements. Judg-
ment below was for the city.
1. There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict and judg-
ment. While there was evidence that the construction of the dike by
the city did divert the flood waters from their natural course or channel
so as to cause the damage to the plaintiff's property, likewise there was
evidence that the waters which caused the damage came from an unusual
and unprecedented flood or act of God and further that the construc-
tion of the dike or embankment did not divert the water onto the plain-
tiff's property and that even if the dike had not been constructed the
volume of the water was such that it would nevertheless flow to cross
and damage the plaintiff's land. Also the jury were permitted to inspect
the property. Under these circumstances, it was purely a question for
the jury and there was sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict.
2. It was proper to instruct a jury that if the waters were turned
out of their natural course by artificial means or obstructions over the
lands of another that the latter has the right to erect such barriers or
construction as will return the waters to their natural course and that
no cause of action arises for the erection or construction of such barriers,
the only effect of which is to return waters to their natural course in
the same quantity and manner as they would have flowed except for
having been diverted. There was evidenc submitted to the jury that the
dike constructed by the city was erected on its own land and that the
purpose of it was to divert waters back into a natural channel so that
this instruction was proper to submit to the jury.-Judgment affirmed.
AUTOMOBILES-LIABILITY-COLLUSION OF POLICYHOLDER PRE-
VENTING RECOVERY-Bagley vs. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Company-No. 13279-Decided November 9, 1936--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Bagley sued the defendant insurance company to recover $5,000
on an automobile liability policy. His daughter sued him on the
grounds of negligence which she alleged occurred while he was driving
an automobile and she was a passenger and default judgment was ren-
dered in her favor for $5,000. Bagley held a $5,000 liability policy
indemnifying him in case of recovery. The court below found that
Bagley had violated the terms of the policy in that he fraudulently col-
luded with his daughter to enable her to obtain a judgment against him
in order that he might in turn collect against the defendant insurance
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company and that he had wholly failed to cooperate with the insurance
company in the suit that his daughter brought against him and that he
refused to verify the answer, thus preventing the insurance company
from making a proper defense and the lower court rendered judgment
in favor of the defendant.
1. The conclusions drawn by the trial court from conflicting
evidence are binding upon the supreme court where the evidence -is suffi-
cient to support the findings.--Judgment affirmed.
EJECTMENT-DAMAGES FOR DETENTION-INSUFFICIENCY OF AS-
SIGNMENTS OF ERROR-FALSE TESTIMONY-AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-Buchanan vs. Burgess
et a.-No. 14022-Decided November 9, 1936-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
Burgess and Phillips, alleging ownership and right of possession,
brought ejectment against Buchanan to recover real estate and damages
for detention. Buchanan admitted their ownership but denied their
right of possession. He claimed this right under oral contract for a ten
year lease, on the faith of which he made valuable improvements and
he counterclaimed for specific performance or for the value of the
improvements plus the good will of the business established on the real
estate. Judgment below was for the plaintiffs for possession and
damages.
1. The first six assignments of error cannot be considered by
reason of failure to comply with Rule 32 of the rules of the supreme
court.
2. False testimony is not one of the grounds for a new trial enu-
merated by the code.
3. In this jurisdiction where the contention is that perjury has
been committed the motion for a new trial must be grounded upon
newly discovered evidence.
4. Affidavit in support of motion for new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence must clearly set forth the evidence. The affi-
davits of the witnesses disclosing newly discovered evidence should be
presented and where they are not presented, the defendant merely makes
an affidavit on information and belief without disclosing how he learned
what the witnesses would testify to nor where they lived and failed to
explain why the affidavits of the witnesses alleged to have knowledge of
the facts were not presented, the affidavit is insufficient.
5. Such affidavit must show why the evidence was not discovered
in time to present at the trial and how it was finally discovered and
diligence must be made to appear.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Campbell not participating-Mr. Justice Holland dis-
senting.
DICTA
TAXATION-DOUBLE TAXATION-LEASE FOR TERM OF YEARS
LESSEE TURNING IN PROPERTY FOR TAXATION AS OWNER-
Board of County Commissioners vs. Boettcher, et at.-No. 13817
-Decided December 7, 193 6 -Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Boettcher and Foster brought suit to recover certain taxes paid by
them and their predecessors in title on a twenty-five foot strip of ground
which their predecessors in title had leased to the Denver Tramway
Company in 1895 for use for station purposes at its central loop in
Denver. The Denver Tramway Company year after year included this
strip of ground in its return for taxes as being the owner thereof and
over a period of years it paid the taxes assessed thereon as a part of its
valuation as a public utility for taxing purposes. In 1920 the fee own-
ers gave a ninety-nine year lease on this twenty-five foot strip of land
with other property to Robert H. Fay subject to the lease or contract
with the tramway company and this lease obligated the lessee to pay all
.taxes which lease was assigned to the plaintiffs herein in 1927. The
plaintiffs below, Boettcher and Foster, recovered judgment on the the-
ory of a double assessment.
1. Since interests in real property may be segregated for purposes
of assessment for taxation to the respective owners of such interests,
such interests, when so segregated, are taxable as such. However, if the
owner of an interest in real property fails to exercise the right to segre-
gate it and returns the whole property for taxation and voluntarily pays
the tax, he cannot complain of a double taxation resulting from such
failure.
2. We cannot say that the tax commission would have placed a
lesser valuation on the property of the public utility, as a unit, had it
been made to appear to them that the tramway company held merely a
limited interest in the property instead of a fee simple title, nor that the
value placed upon it by the tax commission with the property reported
as owned in fee is greater by the amount of the value of the reversionary
interest than it would have been had the tramway company correctly
reported that it held merely a grant of the use of the property.
3. If the tramway company chose to report real estate as owned
by it in fee, when it had only a grant of its use, the excess taxes paid by
it cannot be utilized by the plaintiffs to establish double taxation on
the reversionary interests which they retained in the property. The tax
levied at most was excessive and not illegal and if excessive the com-
plaint should have been made to the assessor to reduce the assessment.
4. There is a distinction between an excessive tax and a double
or illegal tax. In the first instance there must be an allegation that the
administrative remedy was invoked in an attempt to secure relief from
an excessive tax by the proper application to the assessor taxing
authorities.
5. Where the complaint and the evidence are silent as to invok-
ing administrative remedies and the tax appears to be only excessive and
not illegal the complaint fails to state a cause of action.--Judgment
reversed.
DICTA
SECURITIES ACT-REVOCATION OF LICENSE OF DEALER IN SECURI-
TIES-LICENSEE NOT OF GOOD REPUTE-H. L. Shaffer & Com-
pany us. Prosser, as Attorney General-No. 13822-Decided No-
vember 2, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Prosser, as attorney general, revoked the license of the Shaffer com-
pany as a dealer in securities. The district court sustained that action
and to review its judgment this writ is prosecuted.
1. A license once issued under the securities act may be revoked
if it is shown that the licensee is not of good business repute.
2. The reputation of one who controls a company, partnership
or corporation, or is generally understood and believed to exercise such
control, and the reputation of his concern, are inseparable.
3. A man's character is the thing he is, his reputation the thing
others say of him; but "repute," "reputation," and "character" are
words often used in ordinary conversation and writing as well as in
legislation, and all too frequently in court decisions, very carelessly.
Context and intent must generally be resorted to in their interpretation.
4. It is not conceivable that a certificate of good repute would be
issued to an applicant under our statute merely because he had thereto-
fore stood well in his community, in the face of a protest by a district
attorney who imparted the information that the applicant had just been
indicted for a vast securities fraud, and presented evidence conclusively
showing him guilty thereof.
5. A law which prohibits the issuance of a security dealer's
license to one not of "good repute" and the cancellation of such license
theretofore issued, to such person, being clearly an act for the protection
of the public, must contemplate as one "not of good repute" a person of
such character that he cannot, with reasonable safety, be trusted in such
matters.
6. This may be shown either by general reputation in the com-
munity, or among those personally familiar therewith, or evidence or
transactions presumably revealing his character. Hence the objections
that on the hearing specific instances and hearsay were considered are
wholly without merit.
7. The objection that these instances, or this "repute" related to
a time prior to the passage of the act is not tenable.
8. The securities act of 193 1 does not violate section 21 of arti-
cle B of the Constitution which provides that no bill shall be passed
containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its
title. Particularity is neither necessary nor desirable, generality is com-
mendable. If the legislation is germane to the general subject expressed
in the title or if it is relevant and appropriate to such subject, it does not
violate this provision of the Constitution.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating-Mr. Justice Hol-
land dissents.
DICTA
PLEADING-DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE-AT
WHAT TIME SUCH DISMISSAL MAY BE MADE-The Colorado
Utilities Corporation vs. Pizor-No. 13876-Decided November
2, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Defendants in error as father and mother of a minor child brought
suit to recover for the wrongful death of said child by reason of the
child being electrocuted through defective construction of a power trans-
mission line. Demurrer to the complaint was sustained and plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint. Defendant objected to the filing of the
amended complaint for insufficiency of facts. The court treated this as
a motion to strike which it sustained and gave plaintiff thirty days to
elect as to further proceedings. Defendant filed a motion for judgment
of dismissal and plaintiffs then filed their motion to dismiss without
prejudice which latter motion the court granted.
1. An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff at any time before
trial upon the payment of costs if the counterclaim has not been made.
2. No counterclaim had beeni made in this case and the plaintiffs'
right to dismiss at any time before trial was absolute. Its order of dis-
missal, on plaintiffs' election, ended the proceedings at a time when
there was nothing before the court upon which a judgment on the
pleadings could be based. Plaintiffs still had time in which to present a
sufficient complaint, and they could not be deprived of that right by an
order of dismissal with prejudice, as was and is contended by defendant.
The structure of the pleadings was not such that defendant could be
entitled to judgment theieon, and it follows that the order of dismissal
without prejudice did not destroy any right of defendant.--Judgment
affirmed.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-CHANGE OF VENUE-ELECTION-
DEMURRERS--Cole, et al. vs. Hess, et al.-No. 13855-Decided
December 7, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Defendants under the authority granted in the note, confessed
judgment. The defendants thereafter appeared by new counsel and
moved to vacate the judgment and for leave to answer and for a change
of venue. Change of venue was denied but otherwise the motion was
granted and defendants filed an answer and cross-complaint to which
demurrers were sustained, with leave to amend. Amendments were
made and reply filed. When the case came on for trial, plaintiffs, con-
tending that defendants relied upon both fraud and breach of contract,
moved for a rule on them to elect. Under protest they stood on breach
of contract. Plaintiffs then orally demurred for want of facts to sup-
port that defense. The demurrer was sustained, leave to amend denied
and the original judgment was reentered.
1. Under Section 422 of the Code no exceptions need be taken
to written motions for change in place of trial. Furthermore, under
Rule 3 of the Supreme Court a party shall not be deemed to have waived
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his right to place of trial by appearance or plea if his objection thereto
shall be made in apt time.
2. The defendants residing in Alamosa County and the place of
the performance of the contract being in Alamosa County, the change
of venue to Alamosa County should have been granted.
3. New matter in the reply is taken as denied.
4. One may set forth by answer as many defenses and counter-
claims as he may have, whether legal, equitable or both.
5. Motion to elect must be made in apt time. Ordinarily such
motion must be made before trial and if not so raised is waived.
6. The answer pleads a breach of contract and failure of consid-
eration and the cross-complaint charges false representations. The de-
murrer should have been overruled.-Judgment reversed.
CORPORATIONS-FAILURE TO STATE OBJECTS OF CORPORATION IN
ARTICLES-MANDAMUS--REFUSAL OF SECRETARY OF STATE
TO ISSUE CHARTER-George E. Saunders as Secretary of State Vs.
The People, et al.-No. 14006-Decided December 7, 1936-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Petitioners tendered a certificate of incorporation to the secretary
of state of a proposed nonprofit company. The secretary of state refused
to accept the same on the ground that the certificate failed to comply
with the statute in stating the business for which the nonprofit corpo-
ration was organized in that under such heading it stated that the cor-
poration was formed to benefit the widows, orphans, heirs and devis~es
of its members through their mutual efforts through and by virtue of
voluntary contributions being made by each surviving member upon the
death of a member. Petitioners brought mandamus proceedings to com-
pel the secretary of state to issue the certificate and the respondent
demurred on the ground that the writ did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled and respond-
ent elected to stand on his demurrer and the alternative writ was made
peremptory.
1. The demurrer was well taken.
2. While the tendered certificate sets forth the objects for which
the corporation is to be formed it fails to state the particular business
for which it is formed.
3. It is necessary in tendering a certificate of incorporation to
clearly set forth the particular business for which the corporation is
formed. A statement of the particular business in which the proposed
corporation is to engage would require a setting forth of the manner in
which such funds are to be managed and used to effect the intended
beneficial purposes.--Judgment reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating-Mr. Justice Hol-
land dissents.
Dicta Advertisers Merit Your Patronage
FARMS-RANCHES
SUBURBAN HOMES
We appraise, sell and manage irrigated
and non-irrigated farms, stock ranches,
and suburban homes in Colorado. Wyo-
ming, and New Mexico.
L. C. FULENWIDER, Inc.
Associated with VAN SCHAACK & CO.








V OUR TELEPHONE helps you.to be in the right place at the
right time. Whether it's an impor-
tant business matter, a greeting to
the folks back home, a cheerful
word to someone who is ill or a call
to that boy or girl at college, the
telephone takes you there now.@ Long Distance rates are
reduced all day Sunday
and every night after 7
